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People are likely to have an image of the perfect judge. Perhaps a wise old 
man in a long flowing robe sitting on high and handing down a measured and wise 
judgment. King Solomon, for instance, is often referred to as an idealized impartial 
judge.1 Depictions show King Solomon on a throne with the requisite beard and 
robes, and portray him as wise, authoritative, and unambiguously patriarchal. In 
real life, however, judges are not godlike kings but mere mortals. And this is a good 
thing. By allowing judges to be human we can escape a narrative that continues to 
cast the aged, white, male patriarch as an infallible archetype. King Solomon’s 
fallibility is evident: a judge who is willing to split a baby in half with a sword and 
use maternal instincts against a woman in order to solve a fairly straightforward 
problem.2 
 But, if mythical perfection is out of the question, what does this mean for 
judicial impartiality or the “capacity to decide cases with an open mind and without 
bias for or against those who appear before [them]”?3 It means that impartiality is, 
as it always has been, an aspiration. It is a worthy aspiration. One on which it is 
incumbent upon the legal profession to strive towards. But, as Charles Geyh et al. 
describe it, a realistic assessment of impartiality is not a question of whether a 
judge is impartial, but whether a judge is “impartial enough.”4  
In keeping with Geyh’s realistic view of impartiality, I argue for a realistic 
view of implicit judicial bias, i.e. that it is inevitable but addressable. Part I will 
situate judicial bias within current social science research on implicit bias and 
establish an illustrative case study from Judge Richard Posner’s decision in Wassell 
v. Adams.5 Part II addresses why judicial bias matters based on the normative and 
practical concerns of fairness and legitimacy. Part III then discusses current 
prohibitions against bias in the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”) and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
(“Code of Conduct”) and demonstrates that while they address explicit bias, they are 
not intended to address implicit bias and cannot do so adequately. And, Part IV 
proposes practical safeguards based on social science research and tailored to 
judges’ unique role. 
 
1  See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 784 (1994). 
2  1 Kings 3:16–28. 
3  CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET & JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND 
ETHICS 1-3 (5th ed. 2013). 
4  Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 493 (2013).  
5  865 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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I. IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE JUDICIARY 
 
A. Current Social Science Research and Its Application to the Judiciary 
 
For over eighty years, social science research on bias has contributed to a 
growing body of literature.6 Part of this research has given rise to the concept of 
implicit bias and how it affects behavior.7 Because judges are responsible for their 
own behavior and their job is to make decisions on other’s behavior, implicit bias 
research should inform how we view the judicial role. 
To begin, Jerry Kang differentiates explicit from implicit bias as that which is 
“introspectively accessible” versus that which is “introspectively inaccessible.”8 As a 
result, while people may be unwilling to report explicit bias, people are unable to 
report implicit bias.9 Using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), Mahzarin Banaji 
and Anthony Greenwald measured unconscious mental associations by measuring 
response times to words and pictures.10 They found that “schema-consistent 
pairings,” for instance white faces with positive words, took less time for people to 
recognize than “schema-inconsistent pairings,” or black faces with positive words.11 
Similarly, they found that schema-consistent pairings of women with the word 
“family” took less time and fewer errors for people to recognize than schema-
inconsistent pairings of women with “career.”12 
Further, according to Banaji and Greenwald’s IAT research, implicit bias 
levels significantly exceed reported, or explicit, bias levels.13 Other researchers, 
using measures like facial electromyogram and galvanic skin response techniques 
also found that implicit bias measures sharply diverged from reported bias.14 
Scholars have described implicit and explicit bias as “dual attitudes” that exist side 
by side; while the explicit attitude requires conscious retrieval, the implicit attitude 
is automatic.15  
In analyzing implicit bias, Kang unequivocally states “no one is immune,” in 
part because brains are good at sorting things.16 With this in mind, determining 
 
6  MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, at xiv (2013). 
7  Id. 
8  IU Maurer, Fuchs Lecture: Jerry Kang “Intending Equality,” YOUTUBE (Apr. 17, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CqrGmuwWrs [hereinafter Kang Fuchs Lecture]. 
9  Id. 
10  BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 39–41. 
11  Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel 
Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 
UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1130 (2012). 
12  BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 115.  
13  See id. at 47, 67.  
14  John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Kelly R. Beach, Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: Examination of the 
Relationship Between Measures of Intergroup Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
INTERGROUP PROCESSES 175, 183 (Rupert Brown & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 2001). 
15  Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: 
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1041 (2006) (citation omitted). 
16  Kang Fuchs Lecture, supra note 8.  
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whether judicial bias really exists is a simple syllogism: all people have implicit 
biases, judges are people, therefore judges have implicit biases. The views of leading 
jurists correspond with this conclusion. Justice Cardozo said, “deep below 
consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the 
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which 
make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.”17 In keeping with this view, social 
scientists have confirmed that five prevalent “cognitive illusions” affect judicial 
decision-making18 and have also found that judges can associate negative attitudes 
with black people that influence judicial decisions.19 In explaining their findings on 
cognitive illusions, Chris Guthrie et al. concluded that “[j]udges, it seems, are 
human . . . [and subject to] cognitive illusions that can produce systematic errors in 
judgment.”20 
As a result, implicit bias can result in the unequal, albeit unintentional, 
treatment of negatively stereotyped group members. To see how this could play out 
for a judge deciding a case, consider Linda Krieger et al.’s statement that 
“stereotypes can bias decision making implicitly by skewing the manner in which 
inherently ambiguous information about the stereotyped target is perceived, 
characterized, attributed, encoded in and retrieved from memory, and used in social 
judgment.”21 Because of this, a decision-maker like a judge could apply a negative 
stereotype to a person while still “believ[ing] that his judgment and resulting 
decision were based entirely on legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.”22 Banaji and 
Greenwald have established a correlation between implicit bias and prejudiced 
behavior that substantiates Krieger et al.’s conclusion.23  
However, simply because jurists draw implicit associations and can 
rationalize them after the fact does not mean that they act on a particular bias 
consistently. In fact, Krieger et al., drawing on psychological research spanning over 
fifty years, found that whether an individual acts according to bias is situational.24 
Krieger et al. explains that people operate under a certain “tension” as a result of 
dual attitudes.25 In other words, some perceptions, thoughts, and motivations pull 
toward one course of action while others simultaneously pull toward another.26 This 
means that a person will react differently to her stereotypes depending upon 
 
17  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921). 
18  Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
777, 778 (2001). 
19  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial 
Bias Affect Trial Judges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2009). 
20  Guthrie et al., supra note 18, at 778. 
21  Krieger & Fiske, supra note 15, at 1036.  
22  Id. 
23  BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 48–50. 
24  Krieger & Fiske, supra note 15, at 1062. 
25  Id. at 1040 (citation omitted). 
26  Id. (citation omitted).  
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whether the implicit or explicit attitude is dominating her judgment while she is 
forming an impression about the stereotype’s target.27 
Jerome Frank, a prominent legal realist, is said to have quipped that judges 
base their decisions on “what [they] had for breakfast.”28 This is not my claim. 
Rather, I take the view, in Geyh’s words, that “[i]n a post-realist age . . . the best 
empirical work to date shows that the decisions judges make cannot be divorced 
from the judges who make them because judicial decision-making is subject to a 
complex array of legal and extralegal influences.”29 Of these extralegal influences, I 
focus on implicit bias because it is harder to quantify and identify than explicit 
bias,30 its effect on the common law can be felt for generations, and, despite the 
current and unequivocal social science research on implicit bias, we have yet to 
address fully its effect on judges. 
 
B. Wassell v. Adams: An Illustrative Case Study in Implicit Judicial Bias 
 
To illustrate implicit bias’s effect on judicial decision making, we can look at 
Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in Wassell v. Adams31—a 1989 case that is in many 
first-year torts curriculums. The plaintiff was Susan Wassell, a twenty-one-year-old 
woman who was visiting Chicago to see her fiancé graduate from basic training at a 
nearby naval base.32 While visiting, Susan was attacked and raped in her hotel 
room.33 Late one night, hearing a knock and thinking it might have been her fiancé, 
Susan opened the door to a man outside who asked for a glass of water.34 She got 
the water and brought it back; the man, saying the water was not cold enough, then 
went into the bathroom.35 When he came out, he was naked from the waist down, 
and Susan ran from the room.36 The man chased Susan out, caught her, and 
dragged her back into the room, where he raped her several times.37 After several 
hours Susan managed to escape.38 
The hotel was four blocks away from a high crime area, and the owners 
occasionally warned female guests not to walk in the neighborhood at night by 
themselves.39 However, the owners did not warn Susan.40 Susan sued the hotel for 
 
27  Id. at 1041.  
28  See, e.g., Gregory S. Parks, Judicial Recusal: Cognitive Biases and Racial Stereotyping, 18 LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 681, 682 (2015).  
29  Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters - Again, 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 715 (2011).  
30  Kang Fuchs Lecture, supra note 8. 
31  865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).  
32  Id. at 850. 
33  Id. at 851. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
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negligence as a third party to her rape.41 Under a comparative fault statute,42 the 
jury came back with the verdict that she was ninety-seven percent at fault for her 
own rape, and the hotel owners only three percent at fault, thus reducing her 
recovery.43 Susan requested that the judge grant judgment for her notwithstanding 
the verdict either because she was legally nonnegligent or the hotel owners had 
wantonly disregarded her safety.44 Alternatively, Susan requested a new trial 
because the fault apportionment was contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence.45  The court denied both motions, and Susan appealed.46 
Upholding the verdict, Judge Posner, while not expressing any explicit 
discourtesy,47 rested on some concerning description and reasoning. For instance, 
early in the analysis, Judge Posner identified the assailant as a “respectably 
dressed black man.”48 The man’s race (or his attire) does not appear to be relevant 
to the law or facts implicated in the case. But, mentioning traits like race when not 
otherwise relevant can be evidence of either explicit bias or the unconscious 
expression of implicit bias.49  
On the other hand, if race was relevant to the court’s analysis, then its 
mention is even more concerning, because in the context of a comparative fault 
analysis, it suggests that the court’s view was that Susan should have known the 
stranger was a threat because he was a black man. This does not appear to be 
explicit bias because Judge Posner does not make any such connection in his 
analysis. However, the unnecessary disclosure of the man’s race juxtaposed with the 
assignment of Susan’s fault in her own rape points to implicit bias. It is especially 
suggestive of implicit bias given the extant backdrop of the pervasive social-sexual 
myth of black men raping white women,50 and even more so when coupled with the 
fact that rapes are substantially more likely to be intraracial than interracial.51 
 
41  Id. at 852. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  There were times, in fact, when Judge Posner showed a sensitivity to Susan’s plight. For instance, he called 
the defendant’s claim that the hotel could not post a warning because it would be too expensive, “absurd[].” 
Id. at 853. In addition, when he wrote that the plaintiff pretended, post-rape, to like the rapist, he clearly 
stated that she did it “[t]o save herself” and refrained from suggesting that this cast doubt on her rape 
assertions. Id. at 851. 
48  Id. 
49  See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
50  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL FORUM, no. 1, 
at 159 n.54. Although Judge Posner does not disclose Susan’s race, she was white. Amy H. Kastely, Out of 
the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 
63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 283 & n.52 (1994). 
51  From 1973–82, reported rapes with a black offender and white victim represented twenty-three percent of 
rapes. PATSY A. KLAUS & MARSHALL DEBERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROD. 
NO. NCJ 96777, THE CRIME OF RAPE 3 (1985). The reporting guidelines changed in the 1980s and later 
research found that intraracial rape accounted for about eighty-eight percent of rapes. LAWRENCE A. 
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Finally, Judge Posner upheld the jury verdict in spite of, and without even a nod to, 
the fact that using comparative fault in rape litigation is painfully resonant with 
the age old victim blaming epitaph that “she was asking for it.”52 While these 
implications each arguably fall short of overt bias, their cumulative resonance with 
racism and misogyny nonetheless suggests a type of bias at work “deep below 
consciousness.”53 
Of course, the appellate judge’s role is often to review for abuse of 
discretion.54 As a result, the easy explanation is that Judge Posner was simply 
observing his proper role by deferring to the trial court and jury verdict. However, 
Judge Posner is not shy about either correcting an application of law or pointing out 
that he is limited to his role, even though he may not like it.55 In fact, there is one 
point in Wassell that Judge Posner is uncomfortable with, but his discomfort is 
focused exclusively on whether the jury got the percentage of fault correct because 
the jury asked a question about the hotel’s duty to warn that went unanswered.56 
But why is there no concern for the gender and racially problematic aspects 
of the opinion or its applicable law? Judge Posner could have broken new ground in 
third-party rape suits by applying a different standard.57 For instance, one 
alternative is the no-duty approach, which is to “recognize important differences in 
the situation of the two actors that justify treating them differently.”58 Under this 
approach, courts would: (1) “see a difference in failing to prevent injury to oneself as 
opposed to others,” (2) “recognize the different kind of costs that each actor pays for 
not being more cautious or prudent,” and (3) “decide whether reducing or barring 
recovery for rape victims will likely serve the social policy of curtailing high rates of 
sexual assaults.”59 
Of course, it would have required innovation to institute a no-duty exception 
in comparative fault doctrine for third-party rape suits. However, Judge Posner has 
written innovative opinions on many other matters,60 and innovation is consistent 
 
GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROD. NO. NCJ-163392, SEX OFFENSES 
AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 11 (1997). 
52  See Martha Chamallas, Symposium: Who Is the Reasonable Person? Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: 
A New Take on Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1381 (2010); Leah M. 
Slyder, Note, Rape in the Civil and Administrative Contexts: Proposed Solutions to Problems in Tort Cases 
Brought by Rape Survivors, 68 CASE W. RES. 543, 567–569 (2017). 
53  CARDOZO, supra note 17. 
54  Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 1989). 
55  See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996) (following antitrust precedent even though he 
referred to it as “moth-eaten,” “wobbly,” and “unsound”); Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 
916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (lowering the standard of legal liability a railroad company faced for a 
chemical spill); George M. Cohen, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1117, 1117 (1985) (discussing Judge Posner’s “innovative methodological approach”). 
56  See Wassell, 865 F.2d at 856. 
57  A third-party rape case is a subset of tort cases where a plaintiff sues a third party to an attack for 
permitting dangerous conditions or failing to take other reasonable precautions to prevent such an attack. 
Chamallas, supra note 52, at 1354. 
58  Chamallas, supra note 52, at 1383 (citing Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and 
Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1999)). 
59  Id. (citation omitted).   
60  Cohen, supra note 55.  
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with how he views the judge’s role.61 In his words, a flexible, innovative approach is 
required because the “multi-layered character of American law . . . thrust[s] on the 
courts a responsibility for creative lawmaking that cannot be discharged either by 
applying existing rules to the letter or by reasoning by analogy.”62 And yet, in 
Wassell this approach is notably absent. Judge Posner did not acknowledge the 
policy implications of allowing courts to find victims responsible for their own rape, 
express personal distaste for the outcome or implication, mention misogyny or 
racism’s possible effect on the jury, or discuss whether finding Susan ninety-seven 
percent responsible for her own rape could possibly vindicate her individual right to 
redress.63 
Based on these analytical gaps, and Judge Posner’s view of rape published in 
Sex and Reason in 1992,64 I posit that Judge Posner did not see the role that 
misogyny and racism played in allowing Wassell’s jury to find the white plaintiff 
ninety-seven percent responsible for her own rape by a black man—or the common 
law rule that permits victim fault allocation in third-party rape suits in the first 
place. After Sex and Reason’s publication, feminist scholars struggled with Judge 
Posner’s rape discussion, particularly his conclusion that rape is “primarily a 
substitute for consensual sexual intercourse rather than a manifestation of male 
hostility toward women or a method of establishing or maintaining male 
domination.”65 One critic paraphrased that in this view, rape and other acts of 
subordination are not about subordination at all, but are merely efficient practices 
based on “successful adaptations to biological market conditions.”66 
Excavating an old opinion through literary analysis is not proof that Judge 
Posner wrote Wassell under the influence of unacknowledged bias.67 Rather, I use it 
here for illustrative value. Judge Posner was a fiercely academic, rational,68 and 
 
61  RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 12–13 (1995). 
62  Id. (emphasis added).  
63  While Wassell presents a rape involving a black man and a white woman, under a theory of 
intersectionality, black women may have a different experience than either black men or white women, 
particularly when it comes to racism, feminism, misogyny, and rape. See Crenshaw, supra note 50, at 139, 
140, 157–160.  
64  RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).  
65  Id. at 384; see, e.g., Robin West, Review Essay: Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L. J. 2413, 
2440–41 (1993). Naturally, research available at the time of Sex and Reason’s publication, and since then, 
suggests that the motivation to rape is much more complicated. See A. Nicholas Groth, Ann Wolbert 
Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape: Power, Anger, and Sexuality, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1239, 1239 
(1977) (finding that interviewers of 133 convicted rapists concluded that their crimes “were not rapes in 
which sex was the dominant issue; sexuality was always in the service of other, nonsexual needs”); 
Crenshaw, supra note 50, at 158 (critiquing the exclusive focus on rape as an expression of male power over 
women while identifying the rape of black women as part of a racially motivated terror campaign); Heather 
Murphy, What Experts Know About Men Who Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/health/men-rape-sexual-assault.html (identifying that while exclusive 
focus on convicted rapists may skew data, researchers continue to find that hostility to women and power 
are relevant factors in explaining rape). 
66  West, supra note 65, at 2445–46.  
67  See Bruce A. Green, Legal Discourse and Racial Justice: The Urge to Cry “Bias!,” 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
177, 202 (2015) (stating that no social scientist would base a conclusion on one data point). 
68  See Michael B. Brennan, Book Review, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 329, 329 (1995). 
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dedicated jurist. He was not likely to say and do things that were overtly racist or 
misogynistic, and there is no reason to suspect a history of disciplinary proceedings 
for improper conduct toward women and racial minorities.69 But if elements of the 
Wassell opinion can be explained by implicit bias and a person as academic and 
rational as Judge Posner can inadvertently manifest such bias, then without doubt, 
any jurist is susceptible. 
In state trial courts, examples of possible implicit bias play out in the records 
of disciplinary proceedings. In In re Jordan, a disciplinary commission sanctioned a 
judge for twice referring to an attorney appearing before him as “little girl.”70 In 
that case, the commission focused on the second time the judge said “little girl” 
because it found that he used the phrase intentionally to demean the attorney.71 Of 
primary interest here, however, was the commission’s conclusion that the first use 
of “little girl” may have been “an inadvertent expression of unconscious prejudice.”72 
This is evidence that disciplinary commissions at least tacitly recognize that 
implicit bias is qualitatively different than explicit bias and are hesitant to 
discipline it in the same way. 
While in In re Jordan, the bias’s target was an attorney, there are also many 
instances where trial court judges seemingly exhibit implicit bias toward litigants. 
For instance, a New York trial judge, in a case dealing with international students, 
told a prosecutor “you better deport these people” and “you better get them out.”73 
The disciplinary commission waffled about the words’ import.74 Because it wasn’t “a 
continuous pattern of . . . conduct” they were unwilling to conclude that bias was at 
work and hedged their language about what “appear[ed] to indicate distrust and 
dislike of all those from outside his community.”75 However, distrust or dislike is 
precisely the kind of passive antipathy that implicit association researchers have 
identified and we are concerned with here.76 
 
II. WHY IMPLICIT JUDICIAL BIAS MATTERS 
 
Given the strength of contemporary social science research on implicit bias, it 
is clear that unconscious bias exists, and the judiciary is not immune from it. The 
question, however, is does it matter. I argue that bias in the judiciary does indeed 
matter because judges play a substantial role in a common-law system, because of 
normative concern for legitimacy and fairness, and because of the related practical 
concern for compliance and procedural justice. 
 
69  While complaints issued against federal judges are not made immediately public, substantiated complaints 
can lead to public censure and other sanctions that may become public knowledge. See 28 U.S.C §§ 351–55 
(2018).  
70  GEYH ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-37. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 3-26.  
74  Id. 
75  Id. (emphasis added).  
76  See infra text accompanying notes 85–87.  
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In a common-law system, judges have the unique role of applying legal 
precedent to new facts. As a result, the common law is dynamic, and judges have 
significant power in shaping it.77 While this is true for judges presiding over courts 
with both original and appellate jurisdiction, it is perhaps especially true for the 
appellate courts. According to Judge Roger Traynor, the “intellectual process of 
appellate judgment, [is] of the greatest public importance.”78 
At the same time, the legitimacy of government institutions and actors is a 
primary concern because of a representative democracy’s unique theoretical 
underpinnings79 and because of the “wondrous” power that legitimacy has to 
“convince[] losers in law and politics to accept their losses.”80 As a result, it is 
unsurprising that in our governmental system, the judiciary’s role is consistently 
subject to legitimacy concerns,81 many of which are tied to impartiality, both actual 
and its appearance.82 Because unchecked bias both directly reduces a judge’s ability 
to decide impartially83 and gives the appearance of partiality,84 it stands as a 
legitimacy measure. 
One of implicit bias’s dangers is that it can consistently tip justice’s scales to the favor 
of one group and the disfavor of another. This is the case even though scholars generally 
think that people express explicit bias less now than at previous points.85 For instance, 
“rather than antipathy, many now show ambivalence and avoid members of stereotyped 
 
77  See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (13th ed. 2015) (establishing that torts have largely been the creation of judicial 
opinions). 
78  Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 212 
(1957). 
79  In a representative democracy, the government should reflect the will of the people. See ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 290 (1974). For this governmental system to have any meaning, the people 
must understand the institutions of government to be acting legitimately, that is to say, discharging the 
people’s will. See id. at 134 (stating that at the very least, “a legitimate government is one that most of its 
subjects view as legitimately ruling.”).   
80  JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 130 
(2012). 
81  See Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and 
Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 21, 22 (Keith J. 
Bybee ed., 2007). 
82  See id. at 24, 30–31. 
83  See supra Part I. 
84  See John Sides, White People Believe the Justice System is Color Blind. Black People Really Don’t., WASH. 
POST (July 22, 2013, 12:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/22/white-people-
believe-the-justice-system-is-color-blind-black-people-really-dont/?utm_term=.7f330f928deb (reporting that 
sixty percent of African Americans disagreed with the statement that “courts give all a fair trial” and that 
perceptions of procedural injustice informed these attitudes).  
85  See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal's Effect on 
Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011), at 17–18. According to Quintanilla, “[w]hile 
blatant racism has waned, prejudice still persists . . .  the field of social psychology has shown a continuing 
divide between words and deeds toward people of color.” However, we should not construe this to mean that 
all bias is subtle. See Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with Implications for the 
Debates over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 185, 188 (reporting that while 
some gender bias was subtle “much was not subtle at all”). In addition, as Williams points out, once people 
recognize a pattern of bias, even implicit bias is then easy to spot. See id. at 227.    
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groups . . . resulting in decreased helping behavior and cooperation, passive harm, and 
neglect.”86 At the same time, “many exhibit liking and trust toward in-group members, 
resulting in facilitation and cooperation with other majority group members.”87  
In a complex evaluative process, these mental errors can result in courts chronically 
undervaluing out-group members, such as women and racial minorities, and chronically 
overvaluing in-group members, such as white men. In Wassell, how can we explain the 
possibility that Judge Posner just did not assign value to irrelevant racial descriptions, the 
negative policy implications or plain injustice of holding a victim ninety-seven percent 
responsible for her own rape, or to racism and misogyny’s effect of legitimizing and 
encouraging human suffering? It could be that Judge Posner was simply unable to mentally 
recognize that his opinion implicated issues of racial and gender equality;88 he instinctively 
valued them less than some other principles or policy outcomes,89 or both.  
There is good reason to think that implicit bias is especially likely to cause disparate 
valuing when there is ambiguity in the law or a particularly close question. Despite implicit 
racial prejudices, people are less likely to discriminate when there is a clear choice that 
would associate them with biased attitudes and behaviors versus one that would not.90 
However, in the law, there are many instances when there are no clear choices. Karl 
Llewellyn illustrates the point when he says that courts can decide a question, correctly, in 
twenty-six ways and goes onto say “the major defect in [our] system is a mistaken idea . . . 
that the cases . . . plus the correct rules . . . provide one single correct answer to a disputed 
issue of law.”91 Instead, Llewellyn says, “the available correct answers are two, three, or ten” 
and the salient question is “[w]hich of the available correct answers will the court select—
and why?” 92 
Because judges in a common law system have considerable discretion in 
applying the law, this opens the door to bias. Llewellyn describes the “felt need” and 
“felt sense” that judges use in their decision-making93 and instincts are undoubtedly 
as essential to the judicial profession as they are in any other endeavor. However, it 
is very likely that in ambiguous cases, the type of split-second subconscious 
categorization described by implicit bias research informs “felt” needs and sense.94 
 
86  Quintanilla, supra note 85, at 18. 
87  Id. 
88  See supra discussion accompanying notes 50–56, 61–63. 
89  Judge Posner’s self-professed take on feminism is suggestive here: 
[L]aw or government should [not] prescribe a particular role for women or discourage them 
from exercising free choice regarding occupation, marriage, and style of life. Nor, however, 
do[es] [he] believe that women should be put ahead of men or encouraged to lead separate 
lives from men, or that ‘what’s good for women’ should be the lodestar for social governance 
instead of ‘what’s good for the United States’ or ‘what’s good for humankind.’ 
 Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 191. 
90  Quintanilla, supra note 85, at 20 (citing John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4–7 (2004)). 
91  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How 
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950). 
92  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
93  Id. at 398. 
94  See supra Part I. 
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In addition, information-rich environments or even the semblance of information 
give people adequate cover to act on bias.95 Because judges often have substantial 
information supplied by the record, and, as both Llewellyn and Judge Posner 
suggest, law’s application to facts is often ambiguous,96 judicial decision-making is 
fertile ground for implicit bias. 
Judge Posner recognized the relationship between ambiguity and bias in 
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch.97 In describing corporate practices in a discrimination 
case, he said that the white brokers in question “are more comfortable teaming with 
other white brokers” but that “they would doubtless ask a superstar broker to join 
their team regardless of his or her race.”98 Where there is uncertainty, however, 
Judge Posner said, “people tend to base decisions on emotions and 
preconceptions.”99 
To allow the law to consistently favor an in-group while consistently 
disfavoring an out-group is fundamentally unfair. Fairness is central to judicial 
impartiality and, not surprisingly, Merriam-Webster defines fair as “marked by 
impartiality.”100 In the first place, we should care about unchecked implicit bias’s 
unfair effects on judicial decision-making for normative reasons. Our sense of 
fairness helps us intuitively gauge how people treat us against how we want them 
to treat us. In Llewellyn’s words, fairness is part of our “felt sense,” and there is 
significant collective recognition that we should treat others as we would like to be 
treated.101 
However, fairness, like legitimacy, is not just a normative concept to aspire to 
for its own sake. For the rule of law to provide order, there must be compliance.102 
Procedural justice, resting on perceptions of both fairness and legitimacy, helps 
explain why people comply with the law despite adverse outcomes.103 To do so, 
procedural justice captures how individuals subjectively experience the legal 
process.104 Researchers have found that people care both about outcome and, 
 
95  Krieger & Fiske, supra note 15, at 1050–51. 
96  See supra text accompanying notes 60, 91–92.  
97  McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012).  
98  Id. at 489. 
99  Id. One question is how Judge Posner could recognize this preference in McReynolds but not in Wassell. 
One obvious difference is that the opinions were written twenty-eight years apart. Another possible 
explanation is the “bias blindspot,” which is the name given to individuals’ tendency to think they are more 
objective than others. See Kang et al., supra note 11, at 1173.  
100  Fair, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
101  Lisa Capretto, Scholar Points to One Thing Nearly All Major Religions Have in Common, HUFFPOST (Aug. 
17, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/principle-in-nearly-all-major-
religions_us_57b370a1e4b0edfa80d9e0e6 (identifying the Golden Rule as a principle common to most of the 
world’s major religions).  
102  RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 3 (2015). 
103  Tom Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 103, 103 (1988). 
104  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
127, 134 (2011).  
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independently of outcome, the fairness of the process.105 Based on this, procedural 
justice scholars conclude that how an individual perceives the legal process’ fairness 
is “critical to assessments of legitimacy and deference to legal authority.”106  
Our perceptions of fairness rest on unbiased, impartial decision makers. Tom 
Tyler has identified seven factors that determine whether citizens feel judges acted 
fairly.107 Two factors are relevant to actions taken by the parties: the chance to have 
representation and the opportunity to appeal. Five of the seven factors directly 
pertain to the judge. They are the judge’s (1) effort at fairness, (2) honesty, (3) 
ethical conduct, (4) quality of decisions, and (5) bias.108 Tyler not only enumerates 
bias as a stand-alone concern, but it is also implicit in the other four judicial 
conduct factors. Thus, bias is highly relevant to legitimacy and compliance.  
Moreover, litigation’s very purposes include other practical concerns that 
raise the threat of lawlessness. Its purpose is largely to avoid vigilantism, act as a 
deterrent, encourage desirable social conduct, make the injured person whole, and 
provide justice for an individual’s right to redress.109 Judicial decision-making 
thwarts these purposes if subconscious undervaluing is taking place during a 
judge’s evaluation process. We can easily imagine if a court undervalues certain 
people’s claims, it will be unable to make them whole or fully validate their 
individual rights to redress. At the same time, if the court overvalues other people’s 
claims, it is less likely to deter them completely or acknowledge how socially 
undesirable their conduct is. The disparity between one group’s lack of redress and 
recovery against another group’s diminished deterrence and limited social sanction 
can only diminish the legitimacy and power of our legal system . Simply put, 
unchecked implicit bias is not only unfair—it threatens the rule of law. 
 
III. BIAS PROHIBITIONS IN THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND MODEL CODE 
 
The ethical rules in both the Code of Conduct and the Model Code currently 
contain prohibitions against bias. The Code of Conduct’s Canon 3(A)(3) specifies 
that “[t]he duty to be respectful includes the responsibility to avoid comment or 
behavior that could reasonably be interpreted as harassment, prejudice or bias.”110 
Similarly, the Model Code’s rule 2.8 prohibits undignified and discourteous 
behavior111 and rule 2.3 insists that “[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial 
office, including administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.”112 Examples of 
discourteous conduct that have given rise to discipline are verbally abusing and 
intimidating parties in a courtroom, subjecting people to unwarranted searches, 
 
105  Id. at 132.  
106  See, e.g., id. 
107  See Tyler, supra note 103. 
108  Id. 
109  See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 77. 
110  CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(3) (JUDICIAL CONF. 2014).  
111  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r.2.3, 2.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
112  Id.  
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criticizing jurors after a verdict, and using profanity in the courtroom.113 Sanctions 
for these acts include public reprimands, public reproval, suspension, removal, 
etc.114 
Examples of racial bias that have given rise to disciplinary proceedings 
include using racial epithets, making racial “jokes,” referring to certain crimes in 
racial terms, stereotyping racial groups, and using racially charged language.115 
Examples of gender bias include using gender loaded language and insults to 
disparage, making inappropriate comments during domestic abuse cases, referring 
to women as children, pontificating that a woman’s place is in the home, calling 
women terms of endearment in a professional context, and commenting on women’s 
appearance.116 Sanctions in bias proceedings are similar to those resulting from 
discourtesy and include reprimands, public reproval, suspension, and removal.117 
In these examples, there are two common themes: 1) the conduct in question 
is overt, and 2) the biases most readily addressed tend to be explicit, or at least 
perceived to be explicit.118 While the current rules are effective when used to correct 
overt conduct that expresses explicit bias, they are a poor fit for addressing implicit 
bias. For instance, the prohibitions against bias and discourtesy do not easily reach 
a Wassell-type situation. Recall that in Wassell, Judge Posner was not discourteous 
and did not engage in any conduct that was clearly prejudiced toward women or 
racial minorities.119 Where a judge’s implicit associations may surreptitiously allow 
his brain to value women and black men less, fail to recognize racism at play in 
irrelevant references to skin color, or refuse to acknowledge the potential for 
misogyny and racism to inform a legal rule or jury verdict there is a gossamer-like 
quality that makes comparisons with using the “n-word” in open court 
problematic.120 
Moreover, much of the Model Code and the Code of Conduct’s concern for 
impartiality is focused on conflicts, not on bias per se.121 For instance, in Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court used the word bias often,122 but its context was 
violation of a disqualification rule similar to Model Code rule 2.11.123 And the issue 
in the case was whether a West Virginia Supreme Court judge had a conflict in a 
 
113  GEYH ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-3 n.5. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. at 3-23 to 3-28.  
116  Id. at 3-36 to 3-41.  
117  See id. at 3-23 to 3-28. 
118  See Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1095 (2004) (“The canons 
focus on the tensions and potential conflicts that are most easily detected by an outside observer.”).  
119  For instance, Judge Posner was seemingly sympathetic to Susan’s efforts to do whatever she could to get 
away from her attacker. See supra note 47. Additionally, while “respectably dressed black man” is certainly 
suspect in the context of the opinion, the language itself is not inherently prejudiced. See supra text 
accompanying notes 48–52.  
120  Compare supra Section I.B. with supra text accompanying notes 113–16. 
121  See Green, supra note 67, at 183–84.  
122  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 passim (2009).  
123  “Bias” is used similarly in the disqualification rule for federal judges. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED 
STATES JUDGES Canon 3(C) (JUDICIAL CONF. 2014). 
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lawsuit before his court because one of the litigants made very large contributions 
to the judge’s campaign.124 
As the Supreme Court stated in Caperton, disqualification is normally the 
redress for a conflict that gives the appearance or has the actual result of impeding 
a judge’s impartiality.125 However, disqualification is not a viable option for cases 
involving implicit bias. Because all people subconsciously categorize others, we 
would have no judges left to adjudicate if we required judges to disqualify every 
time their brains engaged in an implicit association.126 
Finally, while social science research splits biases into the neat categories of 
explicit and implicit, it also recognizes that people may not always report their own 
biases or may attempt to hide them.127 As a result, we should be careful about 
assuming that all instances of judicial bias will be easily identifiable as implicit or 
explicit, fit in a neat analytical framework, or be addressed mechanically through 
the measures proposed in Part IV. As In re Jordan suggests, it is possible for a 
judge to simultaneously express an implicit bias alongside an explicit bias,128 and it 
may be hard to distinguish the two. We should also assume that judges are 
sometimes able to hide their explicit biases or might be able to use implicit bias as 
cover for what is in fact explicitly biased behavior. My goal is not to give biased 
judges a get out of jail free card, but rather to curb true implicit associations when 
these associations are married to a judge’s good faith commitment to deliver 
impartial justice. I do not intend my analysis to reach judges who deliberately hide 
their equally deliberate bias. 
For the bulk of jurists who are acting in good faith and are subject to implicit 
associations, the need for tailored guidelines is especially pressing because scholars 
have noticed that while overt racism has waned, “the manifestation of prejudice has 
grown more subtle.”129 As a result, while the bias prohibitions in the Model Code 
and the Code of Conduct generally do what they were intended to do, we need 
additional mechanisms to continue working toward our aspiration of an impartial 
judiciary. 
 
IV. BEYOND THE STATUS QUO: NOT LETTING PERFECT GET IN THE WAY OF GOOD 
 
Before turning to the recommendations, it is worth noting a subtle difference 
between the purpose of the Model Rules and Code of Conduct provisions just 
discussed and the measures I propose. The guides to professional ethics exist to 
govern misconduct.130 Because implicit bias is a split-second neurological response 
 
124  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872. 
125  See id. at 888–89. 
126  See Green, supra note 67, at 184. 
127  See supra text accompanying notes 24–27; see also infra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
128  See supra text accompanying notes 70–72.  
129  Quintanilla, supra note 85, at 17.  
130  See GEYH ET AL., supra note 3, at ix. 
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that occurs unconsciously,131 we should be slow to term it misconduct by rote and 
automatically discipline it as such for two reasons. First, the culpability for 
manifesting implicit bias as compared to explicit bias is less. How can a person be 
morally responsible in any meaningful sense when she does not know what she is 
doing?132 Second, we intend ethical rules and their corresponding disciplinary 
processes to act as deterrents.133 Because individuals are not initially in the driver’s 
seat when it comes to their own implicit bias, ethical rules and discipline will be less 
effective as deterrents. 
However, just because implicit judicial bias is unintentional does not mean it 
cannot cause grievous injustice. Sentencing’s racially disparate effect, especially 
death sentences, suggest just how immoral the result of unchecked implicit bias can 
be.134 While we may not have initial control as individuals over the quick 
categorization that our brain goes through when faced with different types of 
people,135 collectively we have control over what we do from there—and willful 
ignorance is not a sufficient excuse. With that in mind, the Model Code and Code of 
Conduct should incorporate the methods below with their other aspirations and 
expectations for judicial conduct. With these expectations in place, disciplinary 
committees could sanction a judge for not engaging proactively in curbing her 
implicit bias but not for having an unconscious bias to begin with. 
The question is whether, since implicit bias occurs in an unconscious process, 
there is anything we can do about it. The research is clear that our implicit 
associations do not always lead to biased decision-making.136 Surveying social 
science research on behavior across many decades, Krieger et al. concluded that 
“whether attitudes predict behavior depends on the attitude, the context, and the 
person.”137  
In examining the correlation between bias and behavior, there are two key 
factors that influence when they will be closely correlated: motive and opportunity 
to deliberate.138 When motive and opportunity are present, attitudes and behavior 
correlate less.139 Krieger et al. build out these two factors into the saliency of social 
 
131  See supra text accompanying notes 8–12.  
132  In analyzing the purposes underlying our criminal law, arguably our legal system’s most punitive area, 
Stuntz and Hoffman identify three overlapping purposes, including retribution. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ & 
JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEFINING CRIMES 11 (2nd ed. 2014). For the purpose of retribution, “punishment . . . is 
a moral good because crime is a moral wrong.” Id. We can analogize between crime and judicial misconduct 
here to the extent they are both socially undesirable activities that cause harm.  
133  See Randall T. Shepard, Foreword to CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET & JEFFREY M. 
SHAMAN, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, at v-vi (2013) (stating that while the rare judge might be a “crook” 
many others are trying to discharge the duties of their office faithfully and use the ethical rules as a 
roadmap to handle avoidable pitfalls with “greater ethical sensitivity”).  
134  See Kang et al., supra note 11, at 1148.  
135  See supra Section I.A.  
136  See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 15, at 1049.  
137  Id.   
138  Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and 
Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 304 (2003).  
139  Id.  
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norms, the decision-maker’s perceived sense of control, the decision-maker’s desire 
to avoid the bias, and relevant information.140 The checks proposed below 
incorporate these concepts and, because the research shows that these factors 
predict the greatest variance when each is present,141 my solutions will be most 
effective when used together. While the proposed solutions are not enough to root 
out all implicit bias, as this section’s title suggests, my goal is to provide a 
framework for taking a meaningful step forward. I focus on using systems that are 
already largely in place in order to minimize the force of objections to moving 
forward.    
The first question is how to provide judges with evidence of their own implicit 
bias so that they will be motivated to address it. Kang et al. suggest that one step is 
having judges take the IAT just like other individuals and professional groups do.142 
In order to promote participation and avoid unnecessary shaming, the assessments 
should be confidential with respect to individual judges, but the aggregated data 
over time should be collected by court administrators in order to target and refine 
efforts. Kang et. al. also suggest judicial training on cognitive illusions, the 
fallibility of heuristics, and how to become sensitized to biases similar to the type 
used in other professional settings.143 Most state court systems can build this into 
their current continuing legal education requirements144 so that they require 
implicit bias training hours each year. In fact, Kang has already supplied a primer 
on implicit bias for courts in partnership with the National Center for State 
Courts.145  
While there are optional training programs for the federal judiciary, there is 
no mandated training, 146 so it would take an extra step to implement this 
suggestion for the federal bench. The Federal Judicial Center is the body charged 
with providing training to federal courts and it currently offers workshops on 
implicit bias.147 For both state and federal courts then, access to adequate training 
materials is unlikely to be an issue. 148 Because annual judicial conferences already 
 
140  Krieger & Fiske, supra note 15, at 1050.  
141  See Fazio & Olsen, supra note 138; see also Alexandra Kalev, Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, Best Practices or 
Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 
589, 589 (2006) (finding that diversity measures were most effective when training, assigned responsibility, 
and steps to reduce minority isolation were employed together). 
142  Kang et al., supra note 11, at 1175–77. 
143  Id. 
144  Forty states have continuing education requirements. Legal Education/Bar Admission Resource Guide, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/legserv/id/86 (last updated May 16, 
2019). 
145  JERRY KANG, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2009), 
https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/accessfair/id/248. 
146  S.I. Strong, Symposium: Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 14 (noting that 
judges “are largely in control of their own educational agendas”).    
147  Programs and Resources for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/education/programs-and-resources-
judges#SF (last visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
148  In addition to the other resources mentioned, the ABA has a resource page dedicated to implicit bias 
training for attorneys and judges. Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/diversity-portal/diversity-inclusion-360-commission.html (last visited Sept. 1, 
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exist and judges typically attend them,149 the easiest way to administer this 
requirement may be to push the training out in partnership with these conferences.  
However, the key is to require the education because if an external body does 
not require it, judges are less likely to opt into this training. A mandate helps 
establish norms and contributes to motivation.150 In addition, people who are 
uncertain in their knowledge are likelier to make more effective educational 
choices.151 While a confident judge is undoubtedly helpful in many contexts, because 
people are unable to perceive their own implicit bias,152 and tend to think that they 
are less biased than others,153 a lack of uncertainty is especially problematic in this 
context. By requiring the training, judges are not left to self-diagnose what social 
scientists know is a typical blind spot.  
The question is then which external body should mandate implicit bias 
training for federal judges. The answer is not the legislature. While there are some 
areas in which the legislature must exercise judicial oversight,154 opening up this 
sensitive and nascent oversight role to the politics between the federal judiciary and 
Congress and the politics between Congress and its constituents, could affect the 
judiciary’s independence and perceptions of its legitimacy,155 would be excruciating 
to watch,156 and would almost certainly result in the false and unfair cry of “Bias!” 
of such concern to Bruce Green.157 With this in mind, the best suggestion is for a 
dedicated Judicial Conference committee to work with the chief judges to determine 
the most effective way to execute and enforce a training requirement.  
Accountability and transparency are essential to successful efforts to 
counteract implicit bias because of the role of social norms in negating the 
 
2020). While the efficacy of these trainings is largely untested, there are at least some interventions 
workshops that, while only tested in small numbers, are showing positive effects. See Jessica Nordell, Is 
This How Discrimination Ends?, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/05/unconscious-bias-training/525405/ (reporting on an 
implicit bias workshop at the University of Wisconsin).  
149  See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES COURTS 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT 22 (2009), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial_council/publications/AnnualReport2009.pdf. 
150  See infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text. 
151  Strong, supra note 146. 
152  See supra text accompanying notes 8–9; Strong, supra note 146, at 15. 
153  See Kang et al., supra note 11, at 1173. 
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§ 1. 
155  See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE 280–82 (2008). 
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Kavanaugh nomination hearings. See Cavett Feazel, Kavanaugh’s Confirmation Hearings a Display of 
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confirmation-hearings-a-display-of-political-grandstanding-september/. 
157  Because implicit bias affects almost everyone but is hard to determine on a case-by-case basis, it would be 
hard to prove an implicit bias accusation, but also equally hard to disprove. See Green, supra note 67, at 
180. As a result, it is unwise to use such accusations as a political club, which is almost certain to occur, at 
least periodically, if the legislature has oversight over this area. See GEYH, supra note 155, at 51–52 
(describing the periodic upheaval that occurs between the public, Congress, and the Supreme Court in 
relation to disfavored opinions); Green, supra note 67, at 181 (discussing the way people might respond to 
disfavored opinions with unprovable bias allegations). 
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expression of bias. To see how this plays out, consider the case of the aversive racist. 
Aversive racism describes racial bias among people who claim to hold egalitarian 
beliefs but who nonetheless act on “indirect, subtle, and less obvious racial 
biases.”158 Notably, aversive racists do not discriminate if strong norms against 
discrimination are present and the discrimination would be apparent to themselves 
or others.159 Without transparency, there is no mechanism of visibility by which 
bias can become apparent to self or others.160 At the same time, accountability helps 
reinforce and establish norms because it signals their relevancy and strength.161 
Adopting language in the Model Code and Code of Conduct will promote 
salient norms, transparency, and accountability in relation to our expectation that 
judges take active steps to reduce the impact of their implicit biases on their judicial 
decision-making. Expressing norms in ethical guidelines increases focus on specific 
behaviors, which serves the interest of transparency because its very idea depends 
on the assumption that another actor is watching.162 Moreover, the Model Code and 
Code of Conduct’s language should be updated so that judges, while not subject to 
discipline for experiencing an implicit association, should be subject to discipline for 
not participating in good faith efforts to curb their implicit associations. If the 
guidelines have no teeth, there is nothing that will trigger formal accountability 
and the efforts will be less effective.163    
 In addition to norms and motivation, having the opportunity for “mindful 
reflection on individuating features,” 164 is essential to overcoming an unconscious 
reaction.165 One way to create the opportunity to deliberate is for judges to make 
the internal commitment before and during each case, bench memo, brief, hearing, 
opinion, and order to not make decisions influenced by bias. In the first place, this 
creates the opportunity to consider “individuating features.” In the second, research 
has demonstrated that people will not make decisions based on bias when the choice 
is clearly biased.166 Judges can further operationalize this commitment by looking 
for situational explanations to replace individual stereotypes167 and deliberately 
considering “countertypical associations” before and during judicial decision-
making.168 Countertypical association is exposure to members of stereotyped groups 
that we would respond to positively or exposure to a member of a negatively 
 
158  Dovidio et al., supra note 14, at 179.  
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164  Quintanilla, supra note 85, at 24.  
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stereotyped group that does not share the stereotypical trait.169 Judges could 
incorporate countertypical associations by a screensaver, desk photo, or work of art 
in their office.170 
Granted, there is no way to enforce compliance or ensure that a judge is 
meaningfully deliberating, but as Alex Kozinski succinctly pointed out, “[j]udicial 
ethics, where it counts, is hidden from view.”171 We already count on judges to do 
their best to discharge their duties faithfully and there is good reason to believe 
that if court systems adopt norms protecting against implicit judicial bias, judges 
will act responsibly to self-regulate in this area, just as they do in many others.172  
 One potentially intransigent obstacle in creating the opportunity to 
deliberate is the workload for judges. Over the past 100 years, cases in district 
courts have shown an eleven-fold increase.173 For federal appellate courts, the 
increase was sixty-four fold.174 In contrast, the population only increased by a factor 
of four, district judges by a factor of ten, and circuit judges by a factor of six.175 At 
the state level, growth in cases over time has outpaced the increase in judges as 
well with state judges increasing at only half the rate of cases.176 I recognize that 
this limits the opportunity to deliberate, but pending costly and systemic change, 
these proposals are crafted with the judicial system’s status quo ante in mind.  
A final method to curb implicit judicial bias is increasing the diversity on the 
bench and in chambers. In the first place, it may be that judges who are members of 
out-groups experience fewer implicit associations favoring in-groups than in-group 
members.177 Studying a small pool of judges, Jeffrey Rachlinski et al. found that 
eighty-seven percent of white judges had a pro-white bias in contrast to forty-three 
percent of black judges.178 In addition, black judges had a significantly weaker pro-
white bias than their white counterparts.179 At the same time, research shows that 
countertypical associations, or exposure to people who run counter to our implicit 
schemas, reduce the expression of implicit bias.180 Lastly, some commentators 
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postulate that people in the in-group and people in the out-groups can “see two 
different realities.”181 For instance, “[w]hite people . . . might only hear a racist 
remark, [but] people of color might register subtler actions, like someone scooting 
away slightly on a bus—behaviors the majority may not even be aware they’re 
doing.”182 
Currently, white men hold judgeships in the greatest number. In federal 
courts, white men are 45.6% of circuit court judges and 49.3% of district court 
judges.183 In comparison, women hold thirty-seven percent of circuit judgeships and 
thirty-four percent of district judgeships.184 By race, black people are thirteen 
percent of circuit judges and fourteen percent of district judges.185 Even more 
concerning is the fact that one circuit has only one woman out of nine judges, seven 
of thirteen circuits have only one black person sitting on them (this includes the 
Eleventh Circuit which has the largest population of black people in the country), 
and one circuit has no black judges at all.186 For district courts, the disparity is 
worse. Eleven of ninety-one courts have no women on them and forty-four have no 
black people serving on them.187 Even starker, black women hold only 4.4% of 
circuit judgeships and 6.1% of district judgeships.188 
State court judges and clerks in both federal and state courts have a higher 
ratio of white men, too. For instance, black judges are between seven to nine 
percent of state court judges across all levels189 and female judges occupy thirty-one 
to thirty-six percent of state judicial seats across all courts.190 At the same time, the 
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estimated percentage of minority members in judicial clerkships is 6.5% and women 
in judicial clerkships is about eighteen percent.191  
Perhaps because these numbers are so stark, Kang et al. recognize the value 
in diversifying the bench but also recognize that it would be a costly endeavor.192 
While increasing judicial diversity at the federal level may require fewer economic 
resources because an appointment process is already in place,193 it would still take 
significant political resources for alignment around diverse candidates. It is 
possible, however, as the Obama Administration’s record shows.194 In contrast, 
because many states select judges through election,195 ensuring diverse results 
would be a very complicated and resource-laden endeavor that would likely require 
revamping entire selection processes through constituent and legislative support. 
With this in mind, one possible stopgap measure to true diversity is to stimulate 
countertypical associations by using pictures, videos, and other indirect contact.196 
Indirect countertypical associations are not a substitute for actual diversity, and 
cannot be expected to promote accountability, transparency, and other norm-
reinforcing interactions among peers to the same degree. However, they are likely, 
as Kang et al. suggest, worth experimenting with.197  
Finally, it is possible that judges will be unable to acknowledge their implicit 
bias because they will not want to lose face or delegitimize their rulings.198 
However, drawing a broad conclusion like this is suspect given that judges 
occasionally admit general error in writing in legal opinions199 or, notably, 
acknowledge bias even after leaving office.200 It might be helpful to remember our 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Because the days of casting judges as perfectly impartial are gone, and 
because the social science research on implicit bias is clear, we should embrace a 
view of the judiciary that allows them to be human but also promotes fairness, 
legitimacy, and procedural justice. This means acknowledging that judges 
experience implicit bias, while neither concluding that impartiality is dead nor 
avoiding responsibility for implicit bias’s effects. Rather, just as the ermine cloak 
used to be the litmus paper on which we gauged our judges’ purity, now we should 
use their actions in response to, and in the face of, implicit associations to prove 
their sincerity in curbing unfairness resulting from unchecked implicit bias.  
The methods I propose are intended to help us, and our judges, do just that. 
Court systems can employ these steps through existing administrative, ethical, and 
disciplinary frameworks by requiring judges to take the IAT, mandating implicit 
bias training, increasing judicial diversity while employing other opportunities for 
countertypical associations, and operationalizing mindful deliberation. In addition, 
norm-reinforcing steps like disciplinary sanctions for not participating in these 
measures and updates to the Model Code and Code Conduct should be employed. 
These efforts are unlikely to be perfect, but I share Kang et al.’s view that “[e]ffort is 
not always sufficient, but it ought to count for something.”202 
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